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Abstract
This paper measures the welfare implications of a depreciation of the US dollar
against the euro using a dynamic equilibrium model. I calibrate a simple two-
country stochastic endowment economy with trade in goods and financial assets
and exogenous variations in the exchange rate. The model displays both a trade
channel effect and an asset channel effect after a change in the value of the exchange
rate. The welfare loss coming from the trade channel translates into the relatively
higher price that consumers have to pay for imports. The asset channel effect
arises from three sources. One is the traditional valuation effect associated with
US debt being denominated mostly in dollars. The other two novel effects are:
(1) the dollar value of investors net worth, mostly denominated in local currency,
increases more in Europe than in the US; (2) asset prices change, causing a portfolio
rebalancing effect which results in a fall in the share of world assets owned by the
US. I show that a dollar depreciation has potentially large negative welfare effects
as measured by the net present value of future consumption. After a temporary
10% depreciation of the dollar, with a half-life of one year, I calculate a 0.25%
decrease in lifetime aggregate consumption for the US consumer.
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1 Introduction
The continuing deterioration of the United States’ current account and net foreign asset
position has raised questions on how to reverse this trend and at what cost in terms of
living standards. This shortfall in net savings will have to be compensated by a rise in
exports and a decrease in imports and in overall consumption, in what is called the trade
channel effect. Most economists believe a significant depreciation of the dollar will be
needed for this to occur (Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005a) and (2005b)).1
Recently, it has been argued that, given the size of the US international investment
position, exchange rate changes cause significant valuation effects in the form of capital
gains or losses. According to this asset channel effect, all else equal, a country with large
asset positions in foreign currency or large external liabilities in its own currency, like
the United States, receives a positive wealth transfer from abroad, when its currency
depreciates. The asset channel can potentially offset some or all of the negative effects
of the trade channel (Tille (2005)).
The first main contribution of this paper is to quantify the costs of a dollar deprecia-
tion using realistic dynamics for the exchange rate. The model treats the exchange rate
as an exogenous process with appropriate persistence and volatility properties.2
The second contribution is to allow for domestic and international portfolio choice
when evaluating the welfare effects of exchange rate changes. Asset choice is relevant for
the exercise as it allows for changes in exchange rates that lead to changes in asset returns
and asset positions. As explained below, this is a new and quantitatively important
component of the asset channel.3
In the model, a drop in the value of the dollar always reduces future US consumption
and welfare if we consider the trade channel in isolation. This is because the price of
goods that the US sells abroad falls relative to the price of goods it buys from the rest
of the world.
A change in the dollar exchange rate also acts in the economy via an asset channel.
There are three aspects to this channel. While the first effect contributes to an increase
1There is a growing body of literature that challenges this ‘consensus view’, as termed by Roubini
and Setser (2005). See, for instance, Engle and Rogers (2006), Backus et al (2006), Cavallo and Tille
(2006), and Mendoza et al. (2006).
2It is not without precedent, however, to take the exchange rate as given: see Dornbusch (1987), for
instance.
3Hau and Rey (2006) find that returns in equity markets and net equity flows are correlated with
changes in the exchange rate. I provide further evidence that this is the case.
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in welfare, the latter two effects generate a decrease in welfare. First, a depreciation of
the US dollar transfers wealth from foreign creditors to domestic debtors, as noted in
Tille (2005), because the US foreign debt is mostly denominated in dollars. Second, due
to home bias in equity, the dollar value of the US investors’ portfolios is increased by less
than the dollar value of the foreign investors’ portfolios. Although 65% of the foreign
asset position of the US is denominated in foreign currency (Tille (2005)), this is only 6%
of the US’ total financial assets and less than 14% of households’ net worth (according
to 2005 Flow of Funds data). The same holds true for other countries, where most assets
are denominated in domestic currency.4 Thus, in terms of total wealth measured in
dollars, the valuation effect of a dollar depreciation against the Euro is much smaller for
the US investor than for the European investor. Third, a fall in the value of the dollar
makes domestic assets cheaper in foreign currency terms, causing a portfolio rebalancing
in which foreign investors buy US equity, with the result that the share of total world
wealth owned by US investors, and US claims to future dividends decrease.
This paper addresses the welfare effects of exchange rate movements in a setting of
large international asset positions and price rigidity for tradable goods. On the one hand,
some degree of stickiness is needed for exchange rate changes to translate into changes
in the terms of trade. On the other hand, large foreign asset positions are needed for
the valuation effects of exchange rate changes to be significant. These two assumptions
are well documented in the literature. For instance, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) have
documented an increasing trend in international financial integration which translates
into sizable gross foreign assets and liabilities. Using disaggregated price data on imports
and exports at-the-dock, Gopinath and Rigobon (2006) find significant price stickiness
for traded goods.
A thorough attempt at quantifying the impact of an exchange rate depreciation on
welfare has been done by Tille (2005). He concludes for large positive welfare effects
arising from the asset channel. In his model, the negative impact of an exchange rate
depreciation through the trade channel is reversed by a large wealth transfer from abroad
when the country has a large gross asset position in foreign assets or a large negative
foreign liability position in local currency. This valuation effect is only mildly counter-
acted by increased income payments to foreign investors because of higher domestic firm
profits after a monetary expansion. Relative to Tille, I allow for lower elasticities of sub-
4For instance, in the United Kingdom, foreign currency denominated assets are 5.3% of total financial
assets and 13% of households’ net worth (2005 data from National Statistics).
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stitution between goods, as well as domestic and international portfolio choice. Devereux
and Saito (2006) study the behavior of the asset channel for external adjustment with a
international portfolio choice model but do not look at the effects coming from the trade
channel.
The model is solved using Evans and Hnatkovska’s (2006) second order approximation
method. The main advantage of this method is its ability to solve models of international
portfolio choice in an incomplete markets setting with many assets, allowing for equilibria
with time-varying risk premia. There has been a recent surge in the study of portfolio
allocation problems in an international setting. Solving a portfolio choice model with
two or more countries poses important numerical challenges, especially with incomplete
markets. Nonlinear approaches other than perturbation methods are very difficult to
implement unless the models are simple and with a small state space (see, for instance,
Kubler and Schmedders (2003)). Linear approximations are a natural way of solving
this class of problems, as long as one takes care of the fact that asset allocations at the
non-stochastic steady-state are indeterminate. One solution to this is to use transaction
costs, like in Ghironi et al. (2006), to create a wedge between returns of various assets
in the steady state. Contrary to the method I use, however, this abstracts from second
moments and does not encompass asset choice for risk diversification purposes.
In a complete markets setting, Engle and Matsumoto (2006) and Kollmann (2006)
address home bias in equity using optimal international portfolio choice. The assumption
of complete markets facilitates obtaining a solution, but is too restrictive for my analysis.
This is because it ignores the wealth effects coming from the asset channel (see Stockman
(1988)). As shown below, with incomplete markets, a dollar depreciation causes a persis-
tent change in the distribution of financial wealth between countries that substantially
increases the cost to US consumers of this currency movement.
In Section 2, I present a simplified model with two countries trading goods with each
other and the rest of the world, but no trade in assets. The goal is to characterize
analytically the conditions under which the United Sates might gain or lose from a dollar
depreciation. With these results in mind, I develop a model with trade in goods and
assets in Section 3. I then quantify the impact on consumption, asset holdings, returns,
and welfare of a dollar depreciation. Section 4 concludes.
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2 Simple model with no asset trade
Consider a simple economy where there are two countries, the United States (US) and
Europe (EU), and the Rest of the World (RW). In this pure exchange economy, there are
two traded goods. Good 1 is the US traded good, and good 2 the traded good from EU.
Each country consumes one nontraded good, YUS in the US and YEU in Europe.
There are also two numeraires, the dollar and the euro, such that the exchange rate
is the relative price of the euro vis-a`-vis the dollar. On the financial side, there is one
nominal bond, 5 equity on each of the trees producing goods 1 and 2, and equity on each
of the nontraded goods sectors. For now, I work in a deterministic setting where these
asset holdings are assumed constant. In Section 3, I deal with the more general case of
portfolio choice in a stochastic environment.
One of the principal features of the model is the assumption that the nominal exchange
rate is exogenous, allowing one to take an agnostic stance on exchange rate determina-
tion and to account for the welfare cost of exchange rate movements, given appropriate
volatility properties for the price of foreign currency.
A required feature of this model is the existence of terms of trade effects, ie, that
a nominal exchange rate depreciation impacts the trade balance. For this, I assume
price rigidity in the traded goods sectors, keeping the prices of nontraded goods flexible.6
Hence, a change in the nominal exchange rate translates, at least initially, into a change
in the terms of trade of equal proportion.
The Rest of the World is assumed to sell or buy any amount of either traded good
at the given price. This means that markets do not have to clear at the given sticky
prices. The model is closed by imposing a balanced current account with RW. This is
achieved by assuming that there is a constant amount of debt outstanding with RW. If
this position is negative (ie, RW is a creditor of the US and EU taken together), then
the interest paid to it will be used to finance a trade deficit (of RW with US and EU).
Let θ and ψ be the fraction of equity on tradable goods 1 and 2 owned by the US
investor, and γ and η be the fraction of equity on the US and EU nontradable goods,
respectively, owned by the same individual. The total amount of bonds outstanding, B,
5it pays interest in dollars, not in units of any of the goods.
6There is evidence of significant price rigidity for import and export goods, as reported by Gopinath
and Rigobon (2006). In fact, they find prices of traded goods at the border to have half-lives of roughly
one year, which contrasts with Bils and Klenow’s (2004) estimate of only one quarter for retail prices.
This difference can be explained by the fact that a large component of the final price of goods consists
of distribution costs and other services typically considered as nontraded (Burstein et al. (2005)).
5
is assumed to be negative and the US is a net debtor. Investors from Europe hold a
fraction β of the US outstanding debt. The interest rate is r.
The US endowments of traded and nontraded goods are D1 and YUS, while the Euro-
pean endowments are D2 and YEU , respectively. Consumption of each traded good and
of the nontraded good are Ci1, C
i
2, C
i
N in country i ∈ {US,EU}. The prices in local
currency (ie, in dollars in US and in euros in EU) of good 1 and 2 are P1 and P2, whereas
the prices of the US and EU nontraded goods are PUS and PEU , respectively. For clar-
ity, I use country superscripts for consumption and financial wealth (as well as for asset
allocations in the next section), whereas for endowments and prices I use subscripts.
The consumers’ problems can be stated as follows, for the US
max
CUS
1t ,C
US
2t ,C
US
Nt
∑
∞
i=1 δ
t log
(
Cα11t C
α2
2t C
1−α1−α2
Nt
)
, (1)
s.t. P1tC
US
1t + StP2tC
US
2t + PUStC
US
Nt ≤ W
US
t , (2)
WUSt = P1tD1tθ + StP2tD2tψ + PUStYUStγ + StPEUtYEUtη + rB
where α1, and α2 are the consumption shares of goods 1 and 2, in the US. For EU
max
CEU
1t ,C
EU
2t ,C
EU
Nt
∑
∞
i=1 δ
t log
(
C αˆ11t C
αˆ2
2t C
1−αˆ1−αˆ2
Nt
)
, (3)
s.t. P1tC
EU
1t + StP2tC
EU
2t + StPEUtC
EU
Nt ≤W
EU
t , (4)
WEUt = P1tD1t(1− θ) + StP2tD2t(1− ψ) + PUStYUSt(1− γ) + StPEUtYEUt(1− η)− βrB,
where αˆ1, and αˆ2 are the consumption shares of goods 1 and 2 in Europe.
I assume preferences to be Cobb-Douglas so that consumption of each good is a
constant share of wealth.7 In the macro literature the elasticities of substitution between
traded goods and between these and the nontraded goods are usually considered to be at
most unity (micro based estimates point to much higher values). In fact, Stockman and
Tesar (1995) use unity for the former and 0.44 for the latter, and Mendoza (1995) uses 1
and 0.74, respectively. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2000) argue for values below unity for
the elasticity between traded and nontraded goods, and Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) use
unity.
Given wealth and prices, the consumption allocations that solve the consumers prob-
7In earnest, I refer throughout this section to W i i = US,EU as wealth. In section, however, it
simply measures income coming from financial wealth. I do this for comparability with the next section
with optimal asset choice.
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lems are
CUS1t = α1
WUSt
P1t
, (5)
CUS2t = α2
WUSt
StP2t
, (6)
CUSNt = (1− α1 − α2)
WUSt
PUSt
, (7)
CEU1t = αˆ1
WEUt
P1t
, (8)
CEU2t = αˆ2
WEUt
StP2t
, (9)
CEUNt = (1− αˆ1 − αˆ2)
WEUt
StPEUt
. (10)
Market clearing in the market for each of the nontradables’ markets requires
CUSNt = YUSt, (11)
and
CEUNt = YEUt. (12)
Definition 1 An equilibrium in this economy is a collection of consumption allocations
{CUS1t , C
US
2t , C
EU
1t , C
EU
2t , C
US
Nt , and C
EU
Nt } and prices {PUSt, and PEUt} such that consumers
solve their utility maximization problem, and the markets for the nontraded goods clear,
given St, P1t, P2t, D1t, D2t, YUSt, and YEUt.
To clarify the importance of the “Rest of the World” assumption, sum the two budget
constraints and use the market clearing conditions for the non-tradable goods, and equity,
to obtain the following residual condition for the traded goods and debt:
P1t(C
US
1t + C
EU
1t −D1t) + StP2t(C
US
2t + C
EU
2t −D2t) = (1− β)rB. (13)
Condition (13) states there is a zero current account balance with RW. If RW is a net
creditor, then it must be case that the interest payments it receives from the two other
countries are being spent in imports of goods 1 and/or 2. This way, the total consumption
of these goods by the US and the EU is smaller than the total endowment available. The
7
sign of B and β determine whether the rest of the world is a net importer or exporter.
Replacing the equilibrium values in the utility function yields:
UUSt = α1 log
WUSt
P1t
+ α2 log
WUSt
StP2t
+ (1− α1 − α2) log YUSt + κ
= (α1 + α2) logW
US
t − α1 logP1t − α2 log StP2t − (1− α1 − α2) log YUSt + κ,
where κ is constant term. A similar expression holds for UEUt .
Differentiating with respect to St delivers for the US and EU yields:
∂UUSt
∂St
=
α1 + α2
WUSt
∂WUSt
∂St
−
α2
St
,
∂UEUt
∂St
=
αˆ1 + αˆ2
WEUt
∂WEUt
∂St
−
αˆ2
St
.
It is immediate from the above expressions that the response of welfare in each country
to exchange rate changes depends on the fraction of wealth that is denominated in euros
(ie, in the degree of home equity bias) and on the bias in preferences towards consumption
of the home traded good. To be more specific, following a dollar depreciation, home bias
in equity works to the detriment of the US, whereas home bias in consumption works in
its favor. In what follows, I discuss the conditions needed to sign the above derivatives.
2.1 Only traded goods
Suppose there are only the two traded goods in the US and EU consumption bundles.
The weight of good 1 in total consumption is now α and αˆ in the US and EU, respec-
tively. In this case, since prices are fixed, the real exchange rate is equal to the terms of
trade, defined as the relative price of the US traded good vis-a`-vis the EU traded good.
With price stickiness, the terms of trade are proportional to (the inverse) of the nominal
exchange rate.
After a dollar depreciation, wealth measured in dollars increases in both countries
because European assets are now more valuable. Specifically,
∂WUS
∂S
= P2D2ψ,
∂WEU
∂S
= P2D2(1− ψ),
8
which shows, given home bias in equity (ψ < 1
2
), that Europe’s wealth benefits by more.
In this simple version of the model, the US trade balance is:
TBUS ≡ P1(D1 − C
US
1 )− SP2C
US
2
= P1D1(1− θ)− SP2D2ψ − rB
RW ,
and for Europe
TBEU ≡ SP2(D2 − C
EU
2 )− P1C
EU
1 ,
= SP2D2ψ + βrB
RW .
The (consolidated) trade deficit with the rest of the world is constant and given by
(13). An increase in the nominal exchange rate causes consumption of good 2 to decrease
and that of good 1 to increase (as its relative price is now lower). Since the dollar value
of the trade balance is constant, the US and Europe import more of good 1 from the
rest of the world and less of good 2. A dollar depreciation causes a deterioration in
the US trade balance and an improvement of the same magnitude in the European one.
This is strictly a price effect: a dollar depreciation means imports from Europe are more
expensive, whereas the unit value of US exports has not changed.8 Noting that
∂CUS1
∂S
=
α
P1
∂WUS
∂S
=
α
P1
P2D2ψ, (14)
∂CEU1
∂S
=
αˆ
P1
∂WEU
∂S
=
αˆ
P1
P2D2(1− ψ), (15)
consumption of good 1 increases in both countries and this increase is proportional to
the share of European equity held by the respective country, ψ in the US and 1 − ψ in
the EU. The higher this share is, the higher the increase in wealth measured in dollars.
As ones expects the US to own a smaller fraction of equity on good 2 than Europe, the
latter experiences a bigger increase in consumption of good 1.
As for good 2, the impact on consumption is
∂CUS2
∂S
= −(1− α)
(P1D1θ + rB)
P2S2
. (16)
8This is an L-curve effect, or an extreme version of the J-curve effect for the trade balance documented
in Backus et al. (1994).
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The US reduces its consumption of the foreign good unless it owes more than −P1D1θ/r.
Furthermore, the higher the consumption home bias, the smaller is the sensitivity of good
2’s consumption to an exchange rate change. As for Europe, consumption of its domestic
good decreases if Europe’s gross foreign income coming from the US is positive. The
condition is given by:
∂CEU2
∂S
= −
1− αˆ
S2P2
(P1D1(1− θ)− βrB) < 0,
which holds, given B < 0, if and only if
β >
P1D1
rB
(1− θ).
This means that for consumption of good 2 to decrease in Europe it must be that β
is not too negative. Furthermore, it becomes clear that the changes in consumption
depend on interest payments. Since these should be small and β is taken to be positive, we
should expect a decrease in consumption of the European traded good, in both countries,
following a dollar depreciation, as the likely outcome.
Putting all these effects in consumption together, the American consumer is worse off
with a dollar depreciation if:
∂UUS
∂S
= α
∂CUS
1
∂S
CUS1
+ (1− α)
∂CUS
2
∂S
CUS2
=
(
α
SP2D2ψ
WUS
− (1− α)
P1D1θ + rB
WUS
)
1
S
(17)
after replacing (14) and (16). From (17) we can see that home bias in consumption and in
equity work in opposite directions in explaining welfare changes. From the first ratio on
the right hand side of (17) we have that a dollar depreciation means the US foreign wealth
is worth more in terms of good 1 and this translates into a US welfare improvement, which
is large if the American consumer displays a high consumption bias towards this good
and if the fraction of US wealth denominated in foreign currency is large. Conversely, the
dollar depreciation means that the US wealth denominated in dollars is worth fewer units
of good 2, which has a negative impact on US welfare proportional to the importance of
this good to the American consumer (given by (1−α)). Again, the higher the home bias
in equity, the more negative it is the impact on US welfare of a dollar depreciation.
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The role of debt is also made clear from this expression: with a large US net debt
position in dollars, interest payments to Europe and the Rest of the World, measured in
euros, decrease after the depreciation. This implies that consumption of good 2 falls by
less.
A caveat is in order. Because, by assumption, all debt is rolled over and equity
positions do not change, the size of this valuation channel depends on asset income, not
on gross asset value. In the case of debt, interest payments are necessarily small when
compared to total wealth. A more favorable case to the US consumer can be made if
there are debt repayments following dollar depreciations.
In Figure 1, I reproduce quarterly net debt flow changes against changes in the euro-
dollar rate.9 There is no discernible relation and the correlation is negative but not
significantly different from zero. Using the monthly data from the US Treasury on trans-
actions between US residents and foreign residents from January, 1977 and until July,
2006, a positive but not significant contemporaneous correlation emerges between net
purchases of US debt securities. The one month ahead correlation, however, is negative
and significant. That is, following a dollar depreciation, US residents tend to sell US debt
securities to foreign investors. The relation is nonetheless weak, as is further verified in
Appendix A.
Rewrite (17) to separate the trade channel, ie, the effect on welfare of changes if the
value of the dollar that occurs independently of international financial linkages, from the
asset channel:
∂UUS
∂S
=

−(1− α)P1D1
WUS︸ ︷︷ ︸
trade channel
+
αSP2D2ψ + (1− α)P1D1(1− θ)− (1− α)rB
WUS︸ ︷︷ ︸
asset channel

 1
S
.
The trade channel always works against the US consumer, but its importance is smaller
the greater the home bias in consumption (high α). The asset channel works in favor of
the US consumer (given that B < 0) but the home equity bias dampens its importance.
The role of consumption bias in the magnification of the asset channel is ambiguous. On
the one hand, it decreases the wealth transfer associated with the dollar denominated
debt held by foreigners. On the other hand, it interacts positively with equity if the US
has a positive foreign net position in equity. The US consumer is better off after a dollar
9This comes from quarterly data from the Flow of Funds on debt flows to and from the Rest of the
World for the period 1975:1-2006:2.
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depreciation if and only if
SP2D2ψ
P1D1θ + rB
>
SP2C
US
2
P1C
US
1
, or
P1D1θ + rB
WUS
<
P1C
US
1
P1CUS1 + SP2C
US
2
, (18)
ie, if there is more home bias in consumption than there is in asset holdings.
In the past few decades, there has been increased international financial integration
(Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2006) and Albuquerque et al. (2005)) that translates into a
smaller home equity bias and eased restrictions on external borrowing. However, Helbling
et al. (2005) also report a downward trend in consumption bias, so it is hard to argue
for a reduced impact of exchange rate changes in consumer welfare on the grounds that
economies are increasingly integrated at the international level.
Redoing the same exercise for the European consumer yields the following expression:
∂UEU
∂S
=
(
αˆ
SP2D2(1− ψ)
WUS
− (1− αˆ)
P1D1(1− θ)− βrB
WUS
)
1
S
.
The first term just means Europe’s share in its domestic equity is worth more in terms
of units of good 1, and this impacts welfare proportionately to this good’s importance in
the European consumption bundle. The second term means Europe’s dollar denominated
wealth is now worth fewer units of good 2, with the impact on welfare depending on the
importance of the domestic good on Europe’s consumption. The trade channel operates
in favor of the European consumer (but a higher home bias in consumption dampens it),
whereas the asset channel is broadly against it.
Note that the distribution of wealth between the US and Europe does not affect these
results. However, this analysis depends on asset holdings not changing. If consumers
want asset allocations that assign roughly constant shares of wealth to each asset, as will
be the case in the next section, then the distribution of wealth will matter. A decrease
in the US share of total wealth (excluding RW) translates into an overall sale of equity
by the US to Europe. The US share of total wealth is decreasing in the exchange rate
as long as the share of European equity held by the US is smaller than the US share of
total wealth (ie, as long as the US owns a larger share of domestic equity than of foreign
equity and the US debt is not too large compared to the European one). That is, the
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distribution of wealth between the US and Europe moves unfavorably to the former if
ψ <
WUS
WUS +WEU
,
which is confirmed by data since the US’ share of world wealth is much larger than the
fraction of foreign equity that it owns.
2.2 Adding nontradable goods
The addition of nontradable goods and cross border positions in these equities increases
the intensities of the movements in consumption and wealth. Let the share of nontrad-
ables in consumption be the same in the US and Europe: 1−α1−α2 = 1− αˆ1− αˆ2 = a.
Solving for US and EU wealth yields
WUS =
P1D1θ + SP2D2ψ + rB
1− a(γ − η)
+
P1D1 + SP2D2 + (1− β)rB
(1− a)(1− a(γ − η))
aη, (19)
WEU =
P1D1(1− θ) + SP2D2(1− ψ)− βrB
1− a(γ − η)
+
P1D1 + SP2D2 + (1− β)rB
(1− a)(1− a(γ − η))
a(1− γ).
From (19) we see that only tradable wealth matters, ie, assets for which there are inter-
national holdings. Any shock to to nontradable output is fully offset by price changes in
these goods.
The impact on wealth from exchange rate changes is
∂WUS
∂S
=
(1− a)ψ + aη
(1− a)(1− a(γ − η))
P2D2,
∂WEU
∂S
=
(1− a)(1− ψ) + a(1− γ)
(1− a)(1− a(γ − η))
P2D2,
and is positive for both countries, as in the previous setting. Note that if there are no cross
border holdings in equity on the nontradable sectors, wealth responds to the exchange
rate the same way as in the case with only tradable goods. That is, the nontradable goods
sectors are only relevant if some of their equity is owned by foreigners. The requirement
of cross-ownership of equity for valuation effects to matter is also present in Ghironi et
al. (2006).
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The responses of consumptions to exchange rate changes are:
∂CUS1
∂S
= α1
(1− a)ψ + aη
(1− a)(1− a(γ − η))
P2D2
P1
,
∂CUS2
∂S
= −α2
P1D1θ + rB
1− a(γ − η)
1
S2P2
,
given prices P1 and P2.
10 The existence of cross border holdings in equity on nontradable
goods has an ambiguous impact on the effect of a dollar depreciation on consumption of
good 1 in the US and Europe. However, it unambiguously decreases the negative impact
on consumption of good 2 in both countries. Again, home equity bias works against the
US consumer.
The condition for the US consumer to be better off (∂U
US
∂S
> 0) is
P1D1θ + rB
SP2D2ψ
<
P1C
US
1
SP2C
US
2
(1− a
ψ − η
ψ
)
If the US holds no equity on the European nontradable goods sector, the above expression
is almost the same as (18) but for the right hand side being scaled by the share of traded
goods in consumption spending (α1 + α2). In this setting, the addition of nontradables
makes it less likely that a dollar depreciation will be welfare improving. This remains
true when the US owns some of Europe’s nontradable sector, as long as it has a larger
stake in the European tradable sector (ie, ψ > η). If there is no home bias in equity,
then adding nontradables to the model is immaterial.
2.3 A back-of-the-envelope calibration with fixed prices
To uncover the impact of an exchange rate depreciation of the home currency on wealth,
prices, consumption, and welfare, I evaluate the above expressions using reasonable values
for the parameters, endowments, and asset holdings, as presented in Table 2. There is
home bias in consumption and equity holdings. Consumption shares of tradable goods
are the same as in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005a) and Cavallo and Tille (2006). The share
of nontradables is set to 50%, roughly the size of services in consumption in the US and
10The impact on EU consumption of goods 1 and 2 is
∂CEU1
∂S
= αˆ1
(1−a)(1−ψ)+a(1−γ)
(1−a)(1−a(γ−η))
P2D2
P1
, and
∂CEU2
∂S
=
−αˆ2
P1D1(1−θ)−βrB
1−a(γ−η)
1
S2P2
, respectively.
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the Eurozone.11
Debt is calibrated to the value of US net foreign debt assets as a share of Households
and Nonprofit Organizations’ net worth in 2004 (tables B.100 and L.107 of the Flow of
Funds Accounts by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). The share
of US foreign debt held by Europe is chosen to match the average of foreign holdings of
US long- and short-term debt securities between 2000 and 2005, as reported by Treasury
International Capital System (TIC) database of the US Department of the Treasury.
Equity holdings are set to match data from the US Department of the Treasury
2004 survey on Foreign Holdings of US Securities12 This calculation assumes the market
value of domestic equity to be evenly split between the tradable goods and nontradable
goods sectors. This yields θ of about 0.807. The US share of Europe’s equity markets is
calculated using the US Department of the Treasury survey on U.S. Portfolio Holdings of
Foreign Securities, under similar assumptions, yielding a ψ of 0.232. There is not much
guidance on what the equity holdings on the nontradable sectors should be. I set them
to be domestically owned up to 95% for the US and Europe. Following Stockman and
Dellas (1989), I expect γ to be close to 1 and η close to 0.
For this baseline calibration, as well as for the case where there is no home bias in
equity, the impact on consumption, welfare, and the distribution of wealth between the
US and the EU of a 10% permanent dollar depreciation are stated in Table 3. Note that in
the baseline calibration there is considerable home equity bias and this impacts negatively
on the US consumer. In the most realistic case (middle column in Table 3), the favorable
effect of the asset channel is not large enough to counteract the drop in consumption
stemming from the terms of trade effect. In fact, consumption of the import goods rises
sharply in the EU and significantly drops in the US, with real aggregate consumption
behaving similarly.13 In terms of welfare, there is a 0.172% increase in EU utility, whereas
utility for the US falls by 0.114%.
With no home bias in equity (last column in Table 3), the US and the EU consumers
share equally the increase in the dollar value of total wealth, but the US consumer
11This is likely an underestimate of the size of nontradable goods sector in the economy. For exam-
ple, Burstein et al. (2005) argue that this share should be much higher as a large component of the
consumption of tradables, such as transportation and retail services, is in fact nontradable.
12This roughly matches data on the foreign holdings of US equity as a share of total market value
of domestic corporations from the Flow of Funds Accounts (Table L.213), for the same year, which is
about 16%.
13This does not translate into an improvement in the US trade balance because the own currency
prices of the traded goods are fixed.
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also benefits from the positive wealth transfer associated with his debt being dollar
denominated. In this case, the US consumer is better off after a depreciation of the
dollar: US utility instantly increases by 0.52%. This is intuitive as the US shares with
Europe in equal terms the increase in the dollar value of equity holdings in the latter.
Since the US also has liabilities in dollars, its real wealth grows whereas the European
one falls, resulting in a drop of 0.17% in EU utility.
In the next section, since assets are not perfect substitutes, the change in the distri-
bution of wealth between the US and Europe matters. The results in (Table 3) indicate
there is scope for adjustment in portfolio holdings in favor of European investors: the
US share of world financial wealth drops by almost 2%. For this to happen, though,
home bias in equity is required. This is because the distribution of financial wealth only
changes if the countries’ portfolios are not equally affected by the valuation effect of the
currency depreciation.
The impact on utility is also disproportionately favorable to the US because of home
bias in consumption. I repeat the exercise with home bias in equity and no cross border
holdings in equity on nontradables (γ = 1 and η = 0), with and without home bias in
consumption, for the cases where there are no nontradables and with nontradables. The
results in Table 4 show that home bias in consumption works in favor of the US consumer.
In fact, the impact on US welfare of the dollar depreciation is -0.7% without home bias,
roughly triple of the impact when there is bias in consumption. The other implication
is that including nontradable goods in the model is far from irrelevant as it considerably
dampens the welfare losses for the US consumer (compare columns the second and third
columns in Table 4 with the fourth and fifth columns of the same table).
3 Model with Optimal Portfolio Choice
In this section, I solve and simulate a model that incorporates optimal portfolio choice
into the model presented in Section 2.
I solve for optimal portfolios when the nontradable sector is owned domestically in its
entirety in each country, ie, γUS = 1 and ηUS = 0, following Stockman and Dellas (1989).
Since these assets are not traded, but have dividend income that correlates with dividend
income of other assets, markets are incomplete and there is imperfect international risk
sharing (see Backus and Smith (1993) and Kollmann (1995) for evidence). In addition,
as noted in Stockman and Svensson (1987) and Stockman (1988), because of incomplete
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international financial markets, exchange rate shocks produce wealth effects which change
the distribution of wealth between countries. This is a crucial feature when analyzing
the importance of the asset channel for consumer welfare.
The share of each asset in terms of wealth (net of total consumption spending) of the
US and EU and the price of the given asset are given by aict and Qit, for i ∈ {θ, ψ, γ, η},
and c ∈ {US,EU}. The dollar gross return on each asset is Ri$t and the gross interest
rate is Rt.
The problems for the US and the EU consumer are similar to what was previously
presented. For brevity, I present the problem for the US consumer only:
max

CUS1t , C
US
2t , C
US
Nt
,
θUS
t+1, ψ
US
t+1, γ
US
t+1, b
US
t+1

∞
t=0
E0
∑
∞
i=1 δ
tU(CUS1t , C
US
2t , C
US
Nt ),
s.t.WUSt+1 ≤ R
US
t+1(W
US
t − P
US
t C
US
t ), (20)
PUSt C
US
t ≡ P1tC
US
1t + StP2tC
US
2t + PUStC
US
Nt ,
where
WUSt ≡ P1t(Qθt +D1t)θ
US
t + StP2t(Qψt +D2t)ψ
US
t +B
US
t + PUSt(Qγt + YUSt), (21)
RUSt+1 ≡ Rt + a
θUS
t (R
θ$
t+1 − Rt) + a
ψUS
t (R
ψ$
t+1 − Rt) + a
US
γt (R
γ
t − Rt), (22)
aθUSt ≡
P1tQθt
WUSt − P
US
t C
US
t
θUSt+1,
Rθ$ ≡
P1t+1(Qθt+1 +D1t+1)
P1tQθt
.
The shares and returns of the other assets (ψ and γ) are similarly defined.
Each of the endowments, the exchange rate, and the prices for traded goods are
assumed to follow a joint autoregressive (in logs) process given by
zt+1 = ρzt + εt+1, E(εt+1ε
′
t+1) = Vε.
The CPI in each country, in dollar terms, is14
PUSt = P
α1
1t (StP2t)
α2P 1−α1−α2USt ,
PEUt = P
αˆ1
1t (StP2t)
αˆ2(StPEUt)
1−αˆ1−αˆ2.
14This is a standard result from homothetic preferences. See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1997).
17
The share of wealth allocated to debt for each consumer is
abi ≡
1
Rt
Bit
W i − P itC
i
t
,
and satisfies abht = 1 − a
θh
t − a
ψh
t − a
γh
t . As in the previous section, the discount bond
is not in zero net supply between these two countries: there is a constant and nonzero
amount of debt outstanding held by RW, such that
BUSt +B
EU
t = B
RW . (23)
This condition allows the prices of traded goods to be treated as exogenous, as made
apparent by (13). However, in contrast with the previous section, debt positions are
optmized.
The Euler equations and market clearing conditions for this economy are standard
and, together with further details on the log-linear approximation, can be found in Ap-
pendix B.
Definition 2 An equilibrium in this economy is a collection of consumption allocations
{CUS1t , C
US
2t , C
EU
1t , C
EU
2t , C
US
Nt , and C
EU
Nt }, asset choices {θ
US
t , θ
EU
t , ψ
US
t , ψ
EU
t , B
US
t , B
EU
t },
and prices {Qθt, Qψt, Qγt, Qηt, Rt, PUSt, and PEUt} such that consumers solve their util-
ity maximization problem, and the markets for assets and nontraded goods clear, given
stochastic processes for {P1t, St, P2t, D1t, D2t, YUSt, and YEUt}.
3.1 Calibration strategy and method
This problem cannot be solved analytically. Moreover, solving it numerically poses sig-
nificant challenges. This is because first order approximations do not work here since
asset allocations are indeterminate in the non-stochastic steady state. One possibility is
to assume, as in Ghironi et al. (2006), transaction costs in asset trade such that returns
are differentiated even in steady state. First order approximations, however, imply that
returns and portfolio choices do not depend on second moments. Nonlinear methods
can be used in this setting, but are computationally expensive for models with more
than a few assets and shocks, and suffer from very ill-conditioned Jacobians. However,
the problem can be significantly simplified using logarithmic utility and unit elastici-
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ties of substitution between goods, such that a second order approximation is viable15. I
adopted the method developed by Evans and Hnatkovska (2006), which can handle many
assets and incomplete markets. Furthermore, the method allows for heteroskedastic in-
novations, which naturally arise in a portfolio choice model with incomplete markets. For
applications of this method, see Evans and Hnatkovska (2005) and Hnatkovska (2005).
In an portfolio choice model with incomplete markets, the state vector includes the
forcing variables, zt, and the distribution of wealth. The state vector includes not only
levels of the state variables, but also their squared terms and cross products. Let the
state vector be Xt ≡ [1 x
′
t vec(xtx
′
t)
′] and the vector of controls Yt. The method consists
in solving the set of equilibrium conditions compactly written as
F(Yt+1, Yt, Xt+1, Xt,S(Xt)) = 0, (24)
under the following assumptions. First, control variables are linear functions of the state
vector:
Yt = ΠXt. (25)
Second, the state vector follows a first order autoregressive process with heteroskedastic
innovations:
Xt+1 = AXt + Ut+1, Et(Ut+1U
′
t+1) = S(Xt). (26)
Finally, the state variables depend on their lagged values, and their lagged squared terms
and cross products (with higher order terms discarded):
xt+1 = Φ0 + (I − Φ1)xt + Φ2vec(xtx
′
t) + εt+1. (27)
The procedure consists in solving a set of equations that comes from approximating,
to a first order, the variables on the real side of the model around the non-stochastic
steady state and approximating to a second order the ones on the financial side of the
model around an initial wealth distribution.
Special care is put in the choice of the parameter values that define the initial wealth
distribution and the non-stochastic steady state. In the model presented in the previous
section and augmented with portfolio choice in the current one, we have three trading
15To be rigorous, logarithmic utility and unit elasticity of substitution are not needed to solve the model
but make approximations simple. The main shortcoming of logarithmic preferences is that they precludes
asset demand for hedging concerns and consumers are fully myopic. Relaxing these assumptions is an
immediate and important extension to this work.
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blocks: US, Europe, and Rest of the World. I calibrate “Europe” to be the roughly
equivalent to the aggregate of the countries in the European Union (EU15). The values
for debt and equity holdings in this initial wealth distribution, as well as the values for
preference parameters, are displayed in Table 2. Therefore, the net foreign debt to wealth
ratio is set to 9% (from the Flow of Funds: foreign debt over household net worth). Of
this debt, 33.5% is held by Europe, and the rest by the Rest of the World. Since there
is not much guidance for choosing values for the preference parameters, namely those
that describe home bias in consumption for tradables, I set these to the values used by
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005b): the domestic traded good amounts to 70% of the total
consumption of tradables in each country. The share of nontradables is set to 50% in
both countries. Elasticities of substitution are set unity, as discussed in Section 2. As
the data is calibrated to a quarterly frequency, I set the discount factor, δ, to 0.99, which
is standard in the literature.
Output for the traded and nontraded goods sectors in each country comes is derived
from quarterly data for Gross Value Added by industry from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis and the European Central Bank’s Statistical Data Warehouse, for the period
1995:I - 2006:II. Specifically, I consider to be traded the output of the following sec-
tors: Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting; Mining; Utilities; and Manufacturing.
Construction and all services are assigned to the sector of nontraded goods. All data is
transformed to logarithms and filtered using the Hoddrick-Prescott filter. The autocor-
relations and variances for the shocks to endowments are chosen by estimating a diagonal
autoregressive system using the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions method. The covari-
ance matrix of the resulting residuals is used as the covariance matrix for the shocks.
Prices for the traded goods are set to unity.
3.2 Results
Using the solution for the policy functions, and laws of motion and covariances of the
state vector, I simulate the behavior of the control variables, following a shock to the
exchange rate, starting at a non-stochastic steady state and initial wealth distribution.
Consider a 10% impulse on the exchange rate (roughly 2.46 standard deviation). This is
done using a Cholesky decomposition of S(Xt).
The welfare cost of a temporary 10% dollar depreciation amounts to a 0.13% decrease
in the US lifetime utility, whereas for Europe it represents a 0.176% increase (first column
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in Table 5). A substantial part of this welfare loss to the US comes from the fall in
consumption of the imported good (Figure 5), that is not compensated (in terms of
lifetime utility) by an increase in consumption of the US export good. The fact that the
shock to the exchange rate has a very persistent effect on the distribution of financial
wealth between the two countries plays a major role on this, as discussed below.
In terms of external adjustment, the dollar depreciation leads to a short run increase
in the US’ current account deficit (Figure 6), operated mainly through an increase in
the deficit of the trade balance (not shown here). Gradually, this deficit is reversed
as the US adjusts downwards its consumption because of the persistent fall in wealth,
discussed below. Thus, the numerical solution to the model exhibits a J-curve pattern in
the trade balance and current account (see Magee (1973), Doroodian et al. (1999), and
Bahmani-Oskoee and Ratha (2004) for evidence).
Since the share of euro denominated assets in each portfolio is higher for the European
investor than for the American investor, the dollar depreciation has a valuation effect over
total net worth that is much larger for the former than for the latter. As expected and
shown in Figure 2, at impact, wealth measured in dollars increases in both countries,
but considerably more so in Europe than in the US. This tilts the distribution of wealth
between these two blocks in favor of Europe. This is expected since the share of European
equity that the US owns is considerable smaller than its share of total wealth (this
condition was established before, at the end of Section 2.1).
As assets are imperfect substitutes, an increased wealth share for Europe causes it
to buy equity from the US (see Figure 3), in a portfolio rebalancing effect as the one
discussed in Bohn and Tesar (1996). To see how this is the case, consider the portfolio
share of US traded equity in both countries: aUSt =
P1Qθtθt
WUSt
and aEUt =
P1Qθt(1−θt)
WEUt
. Since
financial wealth increases more in Europe than in the US, it must be the case that Europe
is buying this equity from the US (ie, θ is decreasing, as shown in the top panel of Figure
3). This portfolio rebalancing due to exchange rate shocks is positively tested in Hau
and Rey (2004) using TIC data on bilateral equity flows.
At the same time, as the US is now relatively poorer, but only temporarily so, it
borrows from Europe to smooth consumption, lowering US wealth below the initial wealth
level. For this reason, the US wealth will converge from below, given enough time,
to the initial wealth distribution. The result that the US borrowing from foreigners
increases after a dollar depreciation is consistent with the behavior of net purchases of
debt securities from foreign residents. I find a positive, albeit weak, correlation between
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future (one month ahead) US external borrowing and a dollar depreciation (see Appendix
A).
It is worth cautioning that we cannot directly compare this calibration exercise with
the one presented in the previous section as here we discuss a temporary change in the
value of the dollar, not a permanent one. For this reason, I redo the exercise without
portfolio choice and with a temporary shock in the exchange rate of the same magnitude
and with the same persistence. The costs to the US and EU consumers are stated in the
last column of Table 5. The impacts on lifetime utility and real aggregate consumption
are much smaller without optimal portfolio choice (in fact, ten times smaller). This is
because there is no persistent effect on the distribution of wealth between the two blocks
besides the one that is coming directly from the persistence of the exchange rate shock.
Thus, asset trade and market incompleteness play a major role in increasing the cost of
exchange rate depreciations by an order of magnitude.
Furthermore, in a setting with optimal portfolio choice, the impact on US wealth
is less favorable because asset prices partially counteract the valuation effect stemming
from the depreciation. In fact, at impact, the valuation effect is offset by as much as
70%, as is apparent by the top right panel in Figure 4. This result is in line with Hau
and Rey’s (2006) finding that higher returns in the home equity market are associated
with a home currency depreciation (a Euro appreciation coexists with a fall in returns
on European equity). In this figure we also see that dollar denominated asset prices
exhibit considerable comovement. The increase in the dollar prices of all assets can be
attributed to the fact that wealth increases in both countries and both investors try to
keep constant asset shares.
These results also imply that models that do not solve for asset prices and allocations
are bound to underestimate the costs for US consumers of a dollar depreciation. Finally, it
supports Obstfeld and Rogoff’s (2005b) scepticism on the magnitude of the contribution
of valuation effects for the external adjustment of the US if asset returns respond to
exchange rate changes.
4 Conclusions
The US has a sizeable external imbalance as measured by the current account deficit. To
correct this imbalance a potentially large dollar depreciation is needed. However, this
shortfall in US savings happens against a backdrop of large gross foreign asset positions.
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This means any changes in the value of the dollar have large valuation effects, which can
mitigate the adverse effects of deteriorating terms of trade. The cost of this adjustment
in the value of foreign currency has recently been the subject of growing attention among
researchers.
The exercise presented in this paper contributes to the quantification of the costs to
US consumers of a dollar depreciation when there are large investments in foreign assets.
This cost is evaluated in a setting of price rigidity of traded goods and portfolio choice.
The model shows that the relative magnitudes of these trade and asset channel effects
on lifetime utility crucially depend on the extent of home biases in consumption and in
asset holdings.
A dollar depreciation unmistakably makes the US consumer worse off as imports
become relatively more expensive. This happens because the terms of trade worsen and
there are only limited valuation gains from the net foreign asset position.
The size of the asset channel effects obtained from models without asset choice is
dampened by the extent of home equity bias and by portfolio rebalancing. This means
the positive wealth transfer that the US receives from abroad after the depreciation,
because its foreign assets are worth more in dollar terms, is greatly reduced by a fall in
foreign asset prices (measured in foreign currency). Furthermore, the temporary dollar
depreciation implies that Europe owns a larger share of traded equity while the US
increases its debt to smooth consumption. This effect on the distribution of wealth is
very persistent because of incomplete international asset markets.
One aspect that deserves closer attention in future research is the substitutability
between goods. If both traded and nontraded goods are worse substitutes than assumed
here, the the welfare losses are likely to be higher. Another aspect that deserves further
consideration is the price adjustment mechanism for traded goods. If the prices of traded
goods are allowed to gradually adjust to changes in exchange rates, the negative effect
of the trade channel may be dampened.
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Appendix A: Cross border debt flows and the exchange rate
This section proceeds with a simple empirical analysis of changes in the amount of debt
owed to Europe by the US following a dollar depreciation. Data on the dollar-euro rate is
from International Financial Statistics and Global Financial Data. Data on net purchases
of US and foreign debt securities by US residents from European residents comes from
the Treasury International Capital System database of the United States Department of
the Treasury. Data is available from 1977:1 until 2006:7. Net purchases of debt were
regressed on log changes of the exchange rate and p-values for regression significance
are obtained using Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard
errors. The results are in Table 1. The results on net purchases of US bonds show that at
first there is repayment of debt as the contemporaneous correlation is positive (6.33%)),
albeit not significant. The one period ahead correlation however is negative at -9.31%
and significantly different from zero. This means that a dollar depreciation is significantly
correlated with increased future borrowing by the US.
Appendix B: log-linearization
Here I describe the approximation to the equilibrium conditions and state variable dy-
namics used to solve the model with Evans and Hnatkovska’s (2006) method. I draw
extensively on this paper and Evans and Hnatkovska (2005).
The equilibrium in this model is defined by the Euler equations for assets and con-
sumption, the two budget constraints, and the market clearing conditions for both assets
and goods. In summary, we have the following conditions:
P1tC
US
1t = α1(1− δ)W
US
t
P1tC
EU
1t = αˆ1(1− δ)W
EU
t
StP2tC
US
2t = α2(1− δ)W
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t
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t
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t
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where wealth and its return are defined in (21) - (22) and their equivalent expressions
for EU.
To economize space, I present the approximation only to the case where γUSt = 1
and ηUS = 0. To generalize it to the case where there are cross border equity holdings
in the nontradable goods sectors is relatively straightforward. The approximate solution
comes from linearizing the equilibrium conditions around a non-stochastic steady-state
and some initial wealth distribution. Evans and Hnatkovska’s (2006) approach consists
in log-linearizing up to the first order the equations and variables of the real side of the
model, while the financial side is approximated up to the second order. From this point
on, all small case letters mean log-deviations from either a non-stochastic steady state
or the initial wealth distribution.
Log-returns are given by Campbell, Chan, and Viceira’s (2003) approximation:
rUSt = rt + a
US
θt (rθt − rt) + a
US
ψt (rψt − rt) + a
US
γt (rγt − rt) +
1
2
(diag(ΣUSt )− Σ
US
t a
US
t )
rEUt = rt + a
EU
θt (rθt − rt) + a
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ψt (rψt − rt) + a
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ηt (rηt − rt) +
1
2
(diag(ΣEUt )− Σ
EU
t a
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where Σct , c ∈ {US,EU} is the conditional covariance matrix for the relevant excess
returns for each country. Each individual return is then approximated as a linear function
of prices and shocks (in log-deviations), like in Campbell and Shiller (1989):
rθt+1 ≃ δqθt+1 + (1− δ)d1t+1 + p1t+1 − qθt − p1t
rψt+1 ≃ δqψt+1 + (1− δ)d2t+1 + st+1 + p2t+1 − qψt − st − p2t
rγt+1 ≃ δqγt+1 + (1− δ)yUSt+1 + pUSt+1 − qγt − pUSt
rηt+1 ≃ δqηt+1 + (1− δ)yEUt+1 + st+1 + pEUt+1 − qηt − st − pEUt.
The Euler equations for consumption of nontradables are easily log-linearized and after
imposing market clearing for these goods’ markets can be written as follows:
pUSt = w
US
t − y
US
t
pEUt = w
EU
t − y
EU
t − st. (B-1)
The six approximate Euler equations for returns can be written in vector form as:
Eter
c
t+1 = Σ
c
ta
c
t −
1
2
diag(Σct). (B-2)
for c ∈ {US,EU}. These Euler equations are combined with the approximations to the
returns and iterated forward, giving solutions to current equity prices as functions of
future dividends (as in Lucas (1978)), goods prices, and excess equity returns.
Because of logarithmic utility, the consumption to wealth ratios are constant which
makes it possible to solve for the stochastic discount factor as a function of wealth only.
Using log-normality of returns, the budget constraints for each country c ∈ {US,EU},
combined with the Euler equations for the bond, are approximated by
Etw
c
t+1 = w
c
t + rt +
1
2
ac
′
t Σ
c
ta
c
t . (B-3)
It is worthwhile inspecting the Euler equations for European equities. For instance,
the Euler equation of the US investor for equity on EU tradable sector is
qψt = ((pis + pip2 + (1− δ)pid2)A− pir − pis − pip2 − pierψ) (I − δA)
−1Xt
=
(
−pis − pip2 + ((1− δ)(pis + pip2 + pid2)A− pir − pierψ)(I − δA)
−1
)
Xt
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where assumptions (25) and (26) are used, and at = piaXt for any variable a. This shows
that the price of traded equity responds to exchange rate changes. In fact, the impact of
the currency depreciation in the dollar value of the European (tradable) equity market
should be at least partially neutralized by a fall in the price of European equity in euro
terms. This possibility was raised in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005a) as a reason to look
with caution at the valuation effects of currency depreciations as potential facilitators of
external adjustment.
Using (B-2) and (B-3), the Euler equation for the nontraded equity of the European
investor can be simplified to
qηt = (piyf + (
1
2
ΛEUt − pierη)(I − δA)
−1)Xt
where ΛEUt Xt = a
f ′
t Σ
EU
t a
f
t and Etrηt+1 − rt = covt(w
EU
t+1, rηt+1) −
1
2
vart(rηt+1) = pierηXt,
as in Evans and Hnatkovska (2006). So, the price of nontraded equity only changes in
response to the exchange rate through its effect in the equity risk premium. In fact,
any shock to the economy that changes the equity risk premia has an impact on asset
prices and equilibrium portfolio shares, as pointed out in Evans and Hnatkovska (2005).
Specifically, shocks that change the covariances between consumption expenditures and
dollar returns or the relative prices of consumption goods have this effect.
The market clearing in the bond market uses the definitions of asset shares, combined
with the clearing conditions of the each equity. The approximate version is:
P1Qθ(p1t+qθt)+SP2Qψ(st+p2t+qψt)+PhQγ(pUSt+qγt)+SPfQη(st+pEUt+qηt)−B
RW /Rrt
= δ(WUSwUSt +W
EUwEUt ). (B-4)
The market clearing conditions for equity are approximated, with minor modifica-
tions, as in the appendix of Evans and Hnatkovska (2005). Conditions (B-1)-(B-4) and
the approximated market clearing conditions for equity are finally written in the same
form as (24) as prescribed in Evans and Hnatkovska (2006). The resulting system of
equations is solved for the policy functions (Π), the law of motion of the state vector
(A), the variances of wealth, and covariances of wealths with one another and the forcing
variables. When solving for the variance matrix Ω0 we have to make sure that the result
satisfies positive definiteness. This is done by solving for the coefficients of a Cholesky
decomposition of that matrix and not for the matrix itself.
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Table 1: Correlation of EUR-USD exchange rate and contemporaneous and one-month
ahead net debt security and net stock purchases by US residents from Eurozone residents.
rt stands for contemporaneous correlation and rt+1 for one month ahead correlation.
Net Purchase of rt p-value rt+1 p-value
US debt securities 0.0633 0.1502 -0.0931 0.0299
Foreign debt securities -0.0525 0.2500 0.0652 0.1799
US stocks 0.0701 0.1006 0.0531 0.2880
Foreign stocks -0.1133 0.0117 0.0085 0.8760
Table 2: Calibration parameters for static model
Parameter Value Definition
α1 0.35 Share of tradable good 1 in US consumption
α2 0.15 Share of tradable good 2 in US consumption
αˆ1 0.15 Share of tradable good 1 in EU consumption.
αˆ2 0.35 Share of tradable good 2 in EU consumption.
β 0.335 Share of US debt owed to EU.
b -0.09 Total US foreign debt as share of household net worth.
r 0.01 Interest rate.
D1 10 Endowment of tradable good 1.
D2 7 Endowment of tradable good 2.
Yh 10 Endowment of US nontradable good.
Yf 7 Endowment of EU nontradable good.
P1 1 Price of tradable good 1 in dollars.
P2 1 Price of tradable good 2 in euros.
θ 0.806 US’s share of equity on tradable good 1.
ψ 0.232 US’s share of equity on tradable good 2.
γ 0.95 US’s share of equity on US’s nontradable good.
η 0.05 US’s share of equity on Europe’s nontradable good.
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Table 3: Percent changes in consumption, welfare, and distribution of wealth of a 10%
dollar depreciation. No asset choice.
Baseline values
Impact on: With Home Bias in Equity No Home Bias in Equity
CUS1 1.996% 3.929%
CUS2 -6.167% -2.497%
CEU1 6.464% 3.924%
CEU2 -1.967% -2.505%
UUS -0.114% 0.520%
UEU 0.172% -0.167%
Real agg. consumption in US -0.343% 0.623%
Real agg. consumption in EU 0.107% -1.163%
Real wealth in US -0.327% 0.675%
Real wealth in EU 0.090% -0.843%
WUS
WUS+WEU
-1.932% 0.000%
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Table 4: Percent changes in consumption, welfare, and distribution of wealth after a
permanent 10% dollar depreciation. No portfolio choice.
Model without Model with
nontradables nontradables
No home bias Home bias No home bias Home bias
Impact in consumption in consumption in consumption in consumption
on: of tradables of tradables of tradables of tradables
CUS1 1.645% 1.645% 1.647% 1.647%
CUS2 -7.283% -7.283% -7.281% -7.281%
CEU1 6.750% 6.750% 6.748% 6.748%
CEU1 -2.178% -2.178% -2.181% -2.181%
UUS -1.831% -0.628% -0.733% -0.261%
UEU 1.725% 0.361% 0.698% 0.149%
Real agg. cons. in US -2.820% -1.035% -1.410% -0.517%
Real agg. cons. in EU 2.287% 0.501% 1.142% 0.250%
Real wealth in US -2.518% -0.967% -1.351% -0.507%
Real wealth in EU 2.042% -0.427% 0.948% 0.202%
WUS
WUS+WEU
-2.281% -2.281% -2.281% -2.281%
Table 5: Percent changes in discounted values of consumption, and welfare after a tem-
porary 10% dollar depreciation (half-life of about one year). Optimal asset choice.
Optimal Portfolio Choice Static Model
CUS1 -0.383% 0.001%
CUS2 -0.737% -0.003%
CEU1 0.854% 0.003%
CEU1 0.496% -0.001%
UUS -0.130% -0.010%
UEU 0.176% 0.007%
Real agg. consumption in US -0.246% -0.020%
Real agg. consumption in EU 0.300% 0.011%
Real wealth in US -0.197% -0.020%
Real wealth in EU 0.316% 0.011%
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Figure 1: Exchange rate changes and Net Debt Flows (Billions of US dollars), 1975:I-
2006:II.
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Figure 2: Impulse responses of wealth in US and EU after a 10% dollar depreciation.
Note: WUSt is financial wealth in dollars in the US.W
EU
t is financial wealth in dollars in Europe.
All values converted to percentage of initial wealth.
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Figure 3: Impulse responses of shares of asset markets owned by US and EU investors
after a a 10% dollar depreciation
Note: θUSt and ψ
US
t are the shares of US and EU equity markets owned by US investors,
respectively. bUSt is the US’ external debt. W
US
t /(W
US
t +W
EU
t ) is the share of total financial
wealth owned by US investors.
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Figure 4: Impulse responses of equity prices in US and EU after a 10% dollar depreciation.
Note: P1tQθt and P
US
t Qγt are the dollar prices for US traded and nontraded equities. StP2tQψt
and StP
EU
t Qηt are the dollar prices for EU traded and nontraded equities.
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Figure 5: Impulse responses of consumption in US and EU after a 10% dollar depreciation.
Note: CUS1t and C
US
2t is the consumption of US and EU traded goods in the US. C
EU
1t and C
EU
2t
is consumption of US and EU traded goods in Europe.
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Figure 6: Impulse responses of current account in the US and Europe (in dollars) after
a 10% dollar depreciation.
40
